{
  "family": "launcher",
  "sample_count": 2,
  "category": "ransomware",
  "description": "Trojan:Win32/Launcher is a generic classification for a critical architectural component of modern malware: the initial execution stub. A 'Launcher' (or Dropper/Loader) is a small, highly obfuscated executable whose *only* job is to evade initial antivirus detection, establish a foothold on the system, and then silently decrypt and start the main malicious payload (like ransomware or a RAT) in memory (`T1106`).<br><br><b>Understanding Launcher Components</b><br>To an end-user, a Launcher is invisible. They might double-click a fake invoice PDF, see nothing happen, and assume the file is broken. Meanwhile, the Launcher is executing in the background. For a SOC analyst, a Launcher detection is the tip of the iceberg. The critical question is not 'How do we remove the Launcher?', but rather, 'What payload did the Launcher execute before we caught it?'<br><br><b>Execution and Evasion Strategies</b><br>Launchers are heavily obfuscated and frequently repacked to defeat static signature scanning (`T1027.002`). Upon execution (often via phishing attachments), the launcher profiles the system to ensure it is not running in a sandbox (`T1497`). It often carries the secondary payload as an encrypted blob within its own resource section. To evade behavioral detection, the Launcher rarely writes the final payload to disk. Instead, it uses Native API calls (`T1106`) to create a suspended instance of a legitimate Windows process (like `svchost.exe`), unmaps its memory, and injects the decrypted malicious payload directly into that process (Process Hollowing) (`T1055.012`).<br><br><b>Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)</b><br>The most crucial IoCs are behavioral. EDR telemetry will show the initial execution, followed immediately by 'Suspicious Process Injection' or 'Process Hollowing'. A classic IoC is the Launcher executable spawning a legitimate Windows binary (like `notepad.exe` or `svchost.exe`) with no command-line arguments, and that child process subsequently making anomalous network connections. The hashes of the injected payloads must be extracted from memory.",
  "cta": "Published by the SystemHelpdesk team.",
  "aliases": [],
  "enrichment_level": "expert-seo",
  "faq": [],
  "faq_count": 0,
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1106",
    "T1055.012",
    "T1027.002"
  ],
  "cisa_advisory": null,
  "last_updated": "2026-06-09",
  "mitre_attack_detail": [
    {
      "id": "T1106",
      "name": "Native API (Using Windows APIs to allocate memory and execute the payload)",
      "tactic": "Execution"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1055.012",
      "name": "Process Injection: Process Hollowing (Injecting the payload into a legitimate process to evade AV)",
      "tactic": "Defense Evasion"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1027.002",
      "name": "Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (Evading static analysis)",
      "tactic": "Defense Evasion"
    }
  ],
  "containment_steps": [
    "Isolate the endpoint immediately; if the Launcher executed successfully, a secondary, highly destructive payload is likely running in memory.",
    "Capture a live memory image (RAM dump) *before* rebooting or shutting down the machine to extract the injected secondary payload.",
    "Analyze the parent process (e.g., Outlook, Word) to determine the initial vector and prevent further phishing compromise.",
    "Hunt for the behavioral patterns (e.g., suspicious child processes) across the network, rather than relying solely on the Launcher's file hash."
  ],
  "what_to_avoid": [
    "Do not close the incident just because the AV deleted the initial 'Launcher' executable; you must verify the secondary payload is not active.",
    "Avoid relying solely on file hashes to hunt for Launchers, as attackers constantly repack the binaries to generate new hashes."
  ],
  "target_industries": [
    "Global / Opportunistic"
  ],
  "motivation": "Opportunistic",
  "threat_actors": [
    "Unknown / Cybercriminal"
  ],
  "target_geographies": [
    "Global"
  ]
}