{
  "family": "mokssteal",
  "sample_count": 8,
  "category": "trojan",
  "description": "PWS:Win32/Mokssteal is a highly specialized Password Stealer (PWS) and Information Stealer (Infostealer) trojan designed to silently harvest and exfiltrate credentials, cookies, and sensitive configuration files from infected endpoints. Unlike generic trojans, Mokssteal specifically targets web browser password stores, FTP clients, and email applications, packaging the stolen data for rapid sale on underground cybercriminal forums (like Genesis Market or Russian Market).<br><br><b>Understanding the Mokssteal Infostealer</b><br>To an end-user, a Mokssteal infection is entirely invisible. There are no pop-ups, no ransom notes, and the system continues to function normally. For a security analyst, a Mokssteal detection is a 'code red' credential compromise event. The malware is designed for rapid execution; it 'smash and grabs' the credentials and immediately exfiltrates them, often completing its objective within seconds of execution.<br><br><b>Execution and Exfiltration Mechanics</b><br>Mokssteal is typically distributed via weaponized phishing attachments (like macro-enabled Office documents or malicious PDFs) (`T1566.001`) or as a secondary payload dropped by an Initial Access Broker. Upon execution (`T1204.002`), it attempts to evade detection by disabling Windows Defender (`T1562.001`). It then systematically queries the SQLite databases used by Chromium-based and Firefox browsers to store saved passwords, cookies, and autofill data (`T1555.003`). It also targets the configuration files of FTP clients (like FileZilla) and email clients (like Outlook or Thunderbird) (`T1552.001`). The harvested data is compressed into a ZIP archive and exfiltrated via HTTP POST requests to a Command and Control (C2) server or dropped directly into a Telegram bot channel (`T1048.003`).<br><br><b>Indicators of Compromise & Impact</b><br>The primary impact is the catastrophic loss of user credentials and session cookies, which frequently leads to Account Takeover (ATO) and lateral movement into corporate networks. EDR logs will flag an anomalous process accessing multiple browser database files (`Login Data`, `Cookies`) in rapid succession. Network IoCs include a brief burst of outbound HTTP/HTTPS traffic or Telegram API connections containing an encrypted archive immediately following the execution of an unknown binary.",
  "cta": "Published by the SystemHelpdesk team.",
  "aliases": [],
  "enrichment_level": "expert-seo",
  "faq": [],
  "faq_count": 0,
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1562.001",
    "T1539",
    "T1048.003",
    "T1555.003"
  ],
  "cisa_advisory": null,
  "last_updated": "2026-06-09",
  "mitre_attack_detail": [
    {
      "id": "T1555.003",
      "name": "Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers",
      "tactic": "Credential Access"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1539",
      "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie",
      "tactic": "Credential Access"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1048.003",
      "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (Telegram API / HTTP POST)",
      "tactic": "Exfiltration"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1562.001",
      "name": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools",
      "tactic": "Defense Evasion"
    }
  ],
  "containment_steps": [
    "Instantly isolate the endpoint, though the exfiltration of credentials has likely already occurred within seconds of execution.",
    "Enforce a mandatory, immediate password reset for *every* account the user has saved in their browser, prioritizing corporate email, VPN, and SSO credentials.",
    "Revoke all active web session cookies for the user to prevent attackers from bypassing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) using stolen cookies.",
    "Use EDR to locate and terminate the Mokssteal process and remove any dropped persistence mechanisms."
  ],
  "what_to_avoid": [
    "Do not assume MFA will protect the compromised accounts; infostealers specifically target session cookies to perform 'Pass-the-Cookie' attacks, bypassing MFA entirely.",
    "Avoid focusing solely on malware removal; the primary incident response must focus on credential revocation and monitoring for anomalous logins."
  ],
  "target_industries": [
    "Global / Opportunistic"
  ],
  "motivation": "Opportunistic",
  "threat_actors": [
    "Unknown / Cybercriminal"
  ],
  "target_geographies": [
    "Global"
  ]
}