{
  "family": "vbklog",
  "sample_count": 3,
  "category": "ransomware",
  "description": "Spyware:Win32/Vbklog is a covert surveillance tool, specifically a Keylogger written in Visual Basic, designed to silently monitor user activity, harvest sensitive data, and exfiltrate it to a remote attacker. Unlike a loud ransomware infection, Vbklog's primary goal is absolute discretion, operating in the background to steal credentials, track browsing habits, and capture keystrokes over an extended period.<br><br><b>Understanding Vbklog</b><br>To an end-user, a Vbklog infection is entirely invisible. There are no ransom notes or slowed system performance. For an enterprise security team, Vbklog represents a critical breach of confidentiality. Because it is often written in Visual Basic (VB), it is easily modified and highly prevalent among script kiddies and low-tier threat actors seeking to steal gaming credentials or personal banking information.<br><br><b>Execution and Data Collection Mechanics</b><br>Vbklog is typically delivered via targeted phishing campaigns containing malicious attachments (`T1566.001`) or disguised as legitimate software (like a game cheat) (`T1204.002`). Upon execution, it establishes stealthy persistence by modifying the Registry Run keys (`T1547.001`). Once active, Vbklog employs standard VB APIs (like `GetAsyncKeyState`) to capture every keystroke typed (`T1056.001`). It may also read the system clipboard (`T1115`) to capture copied passwords. The harvested data is typically written to a hidden text file on the local disk. Periodically, the malware reads this file and exfiltrates the contents to the attacker, often via hardcoded SMTP (email) credentials or a simple FTP upload (`T1048.003`).<br><br><b>Indicators of Compromise & Impact</b><br>The impact is severe data loss and privacy violation. Host-based IoCs include EDR alerts for VB-compiled executables exhibiting suspicious keylogging behavior, or the creation of obfuscated text/log files in the `%Temp%` or `%AppData%` directory. Network IoCs involve regular beaconing to unknown SMTP servers (port 25, 465, 587) or FTP servers to deliver the logs, particularly when the user is actively typing.",
  "cta": "Published by the SystemHelpdesk team.",
  "aliases": [],
  "enrichment_level": "expert-seo",
  "faq": [],
  "faq_count": 0,
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1115",
    "T1048.003",
    "T1547.001",
    "T1056.001"
  ],
  "cisa_advisory": null,
  "last_updated": "2026-06-09",
  "mitre_attack_detail": [
    {
      "id": "T1056.001",
      "name": "Input Capture: Keylogging",
      "tactic": "Collection"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1115",
      "name": "Clipboard Data",
      "tactic": "Collection"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1048.003",
      "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (Exfiltration via SMTP/FTP)",
      "tactic": "Exfiltration"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1547.001",
      "name": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution",
      "tactic": "Persistence"
    }
  ],
  "containment_steps": [
    "Immediately isolate the infected endpoint from the network to halt the exfiltration of sensitive data via email or FTP.",
    "Assume all credentials and passwords typed on the compromised machine have been stolen. Initiate an enterprise-wide password reset for the affected user.",
    "Preserve the system state and locate the local hidden log file where Vbklog stores captured keystrokes to determine exactly what was stolen.",
    "Review firewall and proxy logs to identify the C2 (SMTP/FTP) servers and block them."
  ],
  "what_to_avoid": [
    "Do not allow the user to change their passwords *from the infected machine*; the keylogger will capture the new credentials immediately.",
    "Avoid closing the incident simply by deleting the executable; ensure a full investigation determines the scope of the data loss."
  ],
  "target_industries": [
    "Global / Opportunistic"
  ],
  "motivation": "Opportunistic",
  "threat_actors": [
    "Unknown / Cybercriminal"
  ],
  "target_geographies": [
    "Global"
  ]
}