Mongolock

Overview

Ransom:Win32/Mongolock represents a highly specialized and devastating form of extortion that specifically targets unsecured, internet-exposed **MongoDB databases**, rather than individual user files or endpoints. It is a stark reminder of the dangers of cloud misconfigurations. Unlike traditional ransomware that encrypts files in place, Mongolock completely drops (deletes) the victim's databases and replaces them with a single collection containing a ransom demand, often resulting in total, irrecoverable data loss.

Understanding the Mongolock Threat
To an organization, a Mongolock attack is catastrophic. Their web applications suddenly crash, and upon inspecting the database, all customer records and operational data are gone, replaced by a table named `WARNING` demanding Bitcoin. For cloud security architects, Mongolock highlights a failure in basic access control (`T1190`); the database was left exposed to the public internet without authentication enabled.

Execution and Database Wiping Mechanics
Mongolock does not rely on phishing or malware payloads on an endpoint. Instead, attackers use automated scanning scripts (like Shodan or Masscan) (`T1595.002`) to scour the internet for MongoDB instances exposed on default port `27017` with no access controls configured (`T1190`). Once a vulnerable instance is found, the attacker's script connects directly to the database. It executes a command to completely drop (delete) all existing databases and collections (`T1485`). It then creates a new database (often named `READ_ME_TO_RECOVER_YOUR_DATA`) and inserts a single document demanding a ransom payment in cryptocurrency (`T1486`). Crucially, in many Mongolock attacks, the attackers *do not* actually back up the data before deleting it; paying the ransom results in nothing.

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is immediate, total data loss and massive operational downtime. The primary IoC is the sudden disappearance of all MongoDB collections, replaced by a single ransom note collection. Cloud infrastructure logs (AWS CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log) will show unauthorized inbound connections to port `27017` from unknown IP addresses, followed immediately by massive data deletion commands.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Generated Detections (Boilerplate)

These YARA and Sigma rules are auto-generated based on the family name and aliases. They must be heavily tuned before deployment in a production environment.

YARA Rule

rule MALWARE_WIN_MONGOLOCK {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Mongolock (ransomware)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Boilerplate Generator"
        date = "2026-07-06"
    strings:
        $s1 = "mongolock" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Mongolock Activity
id: b7db3bb82d7911d5034d6ff656c0f00b
status: experimental
description: Detects generic indicators of the mongolock malware family.
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "*mongolock*"
    condition: selection
level: medium

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately alter the cloud firewall/Security Group rules to block all public internet access to the MongoDB instance (Port 27017).
2. Enable authentication and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) on the MongoDB instance immediately.
3. Do not pay the ransom. Mongolock attacks are frequently automated wipers; the attackers rarely exfiltrate or save the data before deleting it.
4. Restore the database from the most recent secure, offline backup taken before the attack occurred.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not expose any database (MongoDB, Redis, Elasticsearch) directly to the public internet without strict IP allowlisting and strong authentication.
2. Avoid assuming cloud providers secure your data by default; securing database access is a customer responsibility under the Shared Responsibility Model.

References & External Analysis

• Search "mongolock" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Families (Category: ransomware)

Explore other malware families in the same category:

• Hostwack
• Nosok
• Bagif
• Kraken
• Cakl

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://jordanricky1604-ship-it.github.io/malware-families-catalog/api/mongolock.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.