Mousedisable

Overview

Trojan:Win32/Mousedisable is a heuristic detection for a specific, highly disruptive behavioral trait found in various 'Joke' programs, Lockers, and poorly written Ransomware. As the name implies, its primary function upon execution is to actively hook into the Windows API to intercept and block all input from the victim's mouse and keyboard (`T1562.001`). This essentially paralyzes the user, preventing them from interacting with the operating system to stop the malware or launch diagnostic tools.

Understanding Mousedisable (Input Blockers)
To an end-user, the computer suddenly freezes; the cursor won't move, and `Ctrl+Alt+Delete` does nothing. For a security analyst, a Mousedisable event indicates a blatant and aggressive attempt by malware to impair defenses and prevent manual remediation (`T1562.001`). This tactic is often a delaying mechanism, used to stall the user while a more destructive payload (like data encryption or exfiltration) executes silently in the background.

Execution and Disruption Mechanics
Mousedisable behavior is typically implemented using the Windows `SetWindowsHookEx` API. The malware installs a low-level keyboard hook (`WH_KEYBOARD_LL`) and mouse hook (`WH_MOUSE_LL`). When these hooks are in place, the malware intercepts all input events before they reach the intended applications or the OS shell. The malware's hook procedure simply discards the input events, causing the system to ignore the user. To prevent the user from simply rebooting to clear the hook, the malware often establishes persistence (`T1547.001`) to ensure it runs immediately upon the next logon.

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is a total, immediate Denial of Service (DoS) for the local user (`T1489`). Host-based IoCs include EDR alerts for 'Suspicious API Hooking' specifically targeting input mechanisms. The primary indicator is the physical manifestation: an unresponsive system that may still be displaying active processes on the screen. Network IoCs are dependent entirely on the secondary payloads the malware might be deploying while the user is locked out.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.

Generated Detections (Boilerplate)

These YARA and Sigma rules are auto-generated based on the family name and aliases. They must be heavily tuned before deployment in a production environment.

YARA Rule

rule MALWARE_WIN_MOUSEDISABLE {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Mousedisable (ransomware)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Boilerplate Generator"
        date = "2026-07-06"
    strings:
        $s1 = "mousedisable" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Mousedisable Activity
id: 4ade839b1c3d1759c67505151d81b7d8
status: experimental
description: Detects generic indicators of the mousedisable malware family.
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "*mousedisable*"
    condition: selection
level: medium

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Perform a hard reboot of the machine (hold the power button); if the malware lacks persistence, this will temporarily restore control.
2. If the malware is persistent, reboot the machine into 'Safe Mode' or use a bootable USB recovery environment to bypass the autorun keys.
3. Once in a clean environment, use an AV scanner or manually inspect the Registry Run keys to delete the malicious executable.
4. Investigate EDR telemetry for the time period during which the mouse was disabled to determine if secondary payloads were executed.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the computer has simply 'frozen' due to a hardware issue; if this happens repeatedly after booting, it is likely malware.
2. Avoid leaving the machine running in a locked state; if it's ransomware stalling you, every minute counts. Hard reboot immediately.

References & External Analysis

• Search "mousedisable" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Families (Category: ransomware)

Explore other malware families in the same category:

• Banspy
• Vkbase
• Primawega
• Boaxxe
• Ruco

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://jordanricky1604-ship-it.github.io/malware-families-catalog/api/mousedisable.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.