Sagecrypt

Overview

Ransom:Win32/Sagecrypt (widely known as **Sage 2.0**) is a highly sophisticated ransomware family that gained prominence in 2017. It is notable for being heavily distributed by massive botnets (like the ones that delivered Locky and Cerber) and for its use of strong, unbroken encryption algorithms. It encrypts a victim's files, appends the `.sage` extension to them, and demands payment in Bitcoin via a dedicated Tor hidden service.

Understanding the Sage Ransomware Threat
To an organization, Sagecrypt is a devastating threat. It is designed for maximum damage, encrypting not just local files, but also aggressively scanning for and encrypting accessible network shares and removable drives. Security analysts note Sage 2.0 for its professional infrastructure; the payment portals are often translated into dozens of languages and feature live chat support to 'assist' victims in buying Bitcoin.

Execution and Encryption Mechanics
Sagecrypt is primarily delivered via massive phishing campaigns (`T1566.001`) utilizing weaponized ZIP files containing malicious JavaScript or Word macros. Once executed, it profiles the system (`T1082`) and uses `vssadmin.exe` and `wbadmin.exe` to delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies and backup catalogs, preventing simple recovery (`T1490`). It utilizes the ChaCha20 symmetric algorithm to encrypt the files rapidly, and an RSA public key to encrypt the ChaCha20 keys (`T1486`). This hybrid approach ensures the files cannot be decrypted without the attacker's private key. Sage drops a ransom note named `!Recovery_[random_chars].html`.

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The primary impact is total data loss across the endpoint and accessible network shares. Host-based IoCs include EDR alerts for the execution of command-line tools aimed at inhibiting recovery (e.g., `vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet`). The most obvious indicator is the mass renaming of files to include the `.sage` extension, accompanied by massive CPU and disk I/O spikes. Network IoCs include the malware attempting to resolve the attacker's Tor payment gateway domains via public DNS servers.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1566.001: Scan email attachments for malicious macros, scripts, or suspicious archive files.

Generated Detections (Boilerplate)

These YARA and Sigma rules are auto-generated based on the family name and aliases. They must be heavily tuned before deployment in a production environment.

YARA Rule

rule MALWARE_WIN_SAGECRYPT {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Sagecrypt (ransomware)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Boilerplate Generator"
        date = "2026-07-06"
    strings:
        $s1 = "sagecrypt" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Sagecrypt Activity
id: d0e807d372a6b967c92a7f674884fbce
status: experimental
description: Detects generic indicators of the sagecrypt malware family.
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "*sagecrypt*"
    condition: selection
level: medium

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately disconnect the infected endpoint from the network to halt the encryption of mapped network drives and SMB shares.
2. Do not restart the machine, as this may trigger a wiper routine or destroy forensic artifacts in RAM that could contain the symmetric key.
3. Identify the initial phishing vector and purge the malicious email from the Exchange server to prevent lateral spread.
4. Initiate the corporate Incident Response plan and begin restoring data from offline, immutable backups.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not pay the ransom unless absolutely necessary for business continuity; payment does not guarantee data recovery and funds organized crime.
2. Avoid reconnecting the infected machine to the network until it has been completely wiped and reimaged.

References & External Analysis

• Search "sagecrypt" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Families (Category: ransomware)

Explore other malware families in the same category:

• Nircmd
• Meikehuayi
• Eggnog
• Mediaget
• Genericrxfp

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://jordanricky1604-ship-it.github.io/malware-families-catalog/api/sagecrypt.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.