Satan

Overview

Ransomware:Win32/Satan (also known as DBGer or Iron) is a highly aggressive crypto-ransomware and Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform that specifically targets and encrypts databases, web servers, and enterprise file shares to maximize business disruption.

Understanding Satan Ransomware
To the victim organization, a Satan infection is catastrophic. Critical databases go offline, and files are encrypted with extensions like `.stn` or `.dbger`. For threat intelligence analysts, Satan is notable for its RaaS model. The original developers created a Tor-based web portal allowing affiliate criminals to generate their own custom Satan ransomware payloads, distribute them, and split the ransom profits (usually demanding Bitcoin). Furthermore, Satan variants are explicitly designed to hunt for and terminate database services prior to encryption to ensure the data files are not locked by the OS.

Execution, Evasion, and Database Targeting
Satan is distributed via spearphishing, exploit kits (like RIG), or by affiliates brute-forcing RDP connections. Upon execution, the malware performs a targeted service stop (`T1489`), aggressively terminating processes associated with SQL, Oracle, Exchange, and IIS (e.g., `sqlservr.exe`, `mysqld.exe`). This ensures the massive database files can be encrypted without error. It deletes Volume Shadow Copies via `vssadmin` (`T1490`) to prevent recovery. Files are encrypted using AES-256 and RSA-2048 (`T1486`). Satan is also known to utilize spreader modules, attempting to copy itself to adjacent network shares (`T1021.002`) and execute via WMI or PsExec.

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is a total halt of business operations due to database and file share encryption. EDR platforms must alert immediately on the rapid execution of `vssadmin` or `wbadmin` commands. Network logs may show SMB scanning (`T1046`) as the malware attempts to spread. The most obvious IoC is the sudden termination of critical database services followed immediately by mass file modification events.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

Generated Detections (Boilerplate)

These YARA and Sigma rules are auto-generated based on the family name and aliases. They must be heavily tuned before deployment in a production environment.

YARA Rule

rule MALWARE_WIN_SATAN {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Satan (ransomware)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Boilerplate Generator"
        date = "2026-07-06"
    strings:
        $s1 = "satan" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Satan Activity
id: 87df2cd1570fd297de238aeee667fe0a
status: experimental
description: Detects generic indicators of the satan malware family.
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "*satan*"
    condition: selection
level: medium

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Instantly sever the infected endpoint or server from the network to halt the lateral spread of the ransomware to other databases and file shares.
2. Do not reboot the server if it is actively encrypting; rebooting can destroy cryptographic material in RAM that might be needed for decryption.
3. Identify the specific variant of Satan (often by the extension appended to the encrypted files) and check for known decryptors.
4. Begin the incident response process to restore the databases and file shares from secure, offline, and immutable backups.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not pay the ransom. Paying funds the RaaS ecosystem and there is zero guarantee the affiliates will provide a working decryption tool.
2. Avoid connecting external hard drives or network shares to the infected machine, as Satan aggressively seeks out attached storage to encrypt.

References & External Analysis

• Search "satan" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Families (Category: ransomware)

Explore other malware families in the same category:

• Yolov
• Genericrxeg
• Xiquitir
• Crowti
• Adpernok

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://jordanricky1604-ship-it.github.io/malware-families-catalog/api/satan.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.