Lucky

Category: ransomware · Aliases: Ransomware.Lucky, Ransom.Satan, Win32/LuckyRansom · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 1 · Enrichment: insufficient_information · Updated: 2026-07-01T17:00:58Z

Category: RansomwareActor: Unknown / CybercriminalIndustry: Global / OpportunisticMotivation: Opportunistic

Overview

Executive Summary

Lucky is a destructive Ransomware family, closely related to (and often considered a variant or evolution of) the notorious Satan ransomware. First identified around 2018, Lucky targets both Windows and Linux environments, aggressively encrypting user files, databases, and network shares to extort cryptocurrency. It is unique for its extensive use of network exploitation tools to move laterally and rapidly spread across an enterprise environment before initiating the encryption routine.

Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities

Lucky is rarely distributed via broad phishing campaigns. Instead, it is deployed by attackers who have already breached the network (often via compromised RDP credentials or exploiting unpatched edge vulnerabilities like Tomcat or WebLogic servers). Once inside, Lucky's execution is methodical and highly destructive:

Lateral Movement (Worm Capabilities): Unlike standard ransomware, Lucky actively scans the local network for vulnerable systems. It utilizes a bundled suite of exploits (including EternalBlue and various Apache Struts/Tomcat exploits) to rapidly propagate to other servers without user interaction.
Encryption Routine: The ransomware targets a vast array of file extensions, utilizing strong cryptographic algorithms (typically AES-256 combined with RSA). Encrypted files are appended with the `.lucky` or `.satan` extension.
Defense Evasion: Before encrypting, Lucky systematically executes commands (via `vssadmin` or `bcedit`) to delete Volume Shadow Copies and disable Windows recovery modes, ensuring victims cannot restore files without the decryption key.

Threat Assessment

A Lucky ransomware infection is a catastrophic, Tier-1 security incident. Because of its worm-like capabilities, a single compromised server can lead to the encryption of the entire corporate infrastructure within hours, resulting in total operational downtime and massive data loss.

Incident Response and Remediation

Immediate Network Segmentation: Do not just isolate the infected machine; physically disconnect critical network segments to halt the lateral spread of the ransomware via EternalBlue.
Do Not Reboot: Avoid rebooting infected machines. Rebooting frequently triggers secondary destructive routines or permanently erases cryptographic material resident in volatile memory that incident responders might use to recover the keys.
Bare-Metal Restoration: Encrypted endpoints cannot be "cleaned." They must be physically isolated, securely wiped, and re-imaged using known-good installation media, followed by data restoration from offline, immutable backups.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1486 T1490 T1210 T1059

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

T1059: Restrict execution of scripting languages such as PowerShell, VBScript, or Python to authorized administrators. Enforce Script Block Logging.

Generated Detections (Boilerplate)

These YARA and Sigma rules are auto-generated based on the family name and aliases. They must be heavily tuned before deployment in a production environment.

YARA Rule

rule MALWARE_WIN_LUCKY {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Lucky (ransomware)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Boilerplate Generator"
        date = "2026-07-06"
    strings:
        $s1 = "lucky" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "ransomware.lucky" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "ransom.satan" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/luckyransom" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Lucky Activity
id: 339a65e93299ad8d72c42b263aa23117
status: experimental
description: Detects generic indicators of the lucky malware family.
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "*lucky*"
            - "*ransomware.lucky*"
            - "*ransom.satan*"
            - "*win32/luckyransom*"
    condition: selection
level: medium

References & External Analysis

Search "lucky" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)

Frequently Asked Questions

How do I remove the Lucky Ransomware from Windows?

Manual removal of Lucky is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

Is Lucky a virus or a Ransomware?

Lucky is classified as a Ransomware. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Lucky typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.

What are the main symptoms of a Lucky infection?

Symptoms of Lucky can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Related Families (Category: ransomware)

Explore other malware families in the same category:

Protect Your Network Against Ransomwares

Want to prevent Lucky and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Ransomware Protection Guide.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://jordanricky1604-ship-it.github.io/malware-families-catalog/api/lucky.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.